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Abstract 
We design a spatial model featuring workers embodied with heterogeneous skills. In 
equilibrium, locations with improved market access become relatively more attractive to the 
high-skilled, high-income earners. We then empirically analyze the effects of the construction 
of the Swiss highway network between 1960 and 2010 on the distribution of income at the 
local level, as well as on employment and commuting by education level. We find that the 
advent of a new highway access within 10km led to a long-term 19%-increase of the share of 
high-income taxpayers and a 6%-decrease of the share of low-income taxpayers. Results are 
similar for employment data decomposed by education level, as well as for in- and out-
commuters. Highways also contributed to job and residential urban sprawl. 
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Introduction
Transportation infrastructures shape the spatial economy in fundamental ways. The advent
of a new highway affects market access of firms and consumers. By facilitating commuting,
highways also expand the pool of potential employees that firms may hire as well as the
pool of jobs that workers have access to. Heterogeneous workers make different working
and residential location choices, implying that highways affect the composition of workers
and residents in the locations they connect.
In order to formalize the distributional consequences of highway expansions, the paper
first develops a spatial equilibrium model featuring costly trade, costly commuting, and
workers embodied with heterogeneous skills and idiosyncratic location preferences (Section
1). In equilibrium, a reduction in the cost of transporting goods and commuters increases
market access and commuting possibilities for the newly connected locations, which in-
creases their attractiveness. The multinomial logit formulation of individual location choices
in our model leads to a strong complementarity between the quality of workers’ skills and the
attractiveness of a location. A newly connected municipality therefore attracts high-skilled
workers in a disproportionate manner. The skill and earnings distributions shift to the right
as a result.
We then empirically investigate the effect of improved accessibility on income distribution
at the local level, exploiting variation in municipalities’ accessibility over time resulting from
the construction of the Swiss highway network (Section 2). Switzerland provides an ideal
setting as the Swiss highway network was to a large extent defined in 1960 by the federal
parliament to connect Switzerland’s largest cities, but only gradually constructed over the
decades that followed. From the perspective of a non-urban municipality, the opening date
of a new highway section in its vicinity is close to random and exogenous to the initial
path of its local economic development. Merging several distinct data sets, we exploit this
variation over time to identify the effect of the opening of a new highway access point on the
total number of taxpayers (resident households), the share of taxpayers in different income
categories, as well as employment and commuting by education levels.
We find that the number of taxpayers and the share of top-income taxpayers both rise
in non-urban municipalities located within 10km of newly opened highway access points
(Section 3). While the total number of taxpayers increases by 11%, the share of low-income
taxpayers decreases by 6% and the share of top-income taxpayers increases by 19%. These
effects are heavily localized. For municipalities located between 10km and 15km, we still
find a shift in the income distribution but no effect on the total number of taxpayers; for
municipalities located beyond 15km, we find an effect only on the share of top-income
taxpayers.
Our theoretical framework proposes that shifts in the income distribution of municipalities
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induced by highway access results from the sorting of a heterogeneous population. Other
channels are possible, such as non-homothetic effects on wages and learning (De La Roca
and Puga, 2017; Glaeser, 1999). Our taxpayer data do not allow us to track individuals
over time and space. Instead, we provide direct evidence for sorting using census data
and an alternative specification based on employment by education level. We find that the
share of highly-educated residents and workers increases in municipalities that get access to
the highway network, while the share of residents and workers with intermediate levels of
education decreases in such municipalities.
Our model also predicts a positive effect on the number of in-commuters but an ambigu-
ous effect on the number of out-commuters. For both in- and out-commuters, the effect
should be strongest at the top of the skill distribution. Consistent with this prediction,
we find no effect on the number of out-commuters, a positive effect on the number of
in-commuters, and an increase in the share of in- and out-commuters with a high level
of education. Finally, we include the main metropolitan areas in order to evaluate whether
highway access leads to a concentration or diffusion of economic activity. We find a sub-
urbanization effect on jobs and residences, a process that is especially pronounced for the
high-skilled.
In the final section of the paper (Section 4), we show that our qualitative results are
robust to using alternative specifications, such as adding several leads and lags to explore
pre-opening trends and the impact over time, a ‘difference-in-differences’ specification that
includes municipalities that never get treated, and a placebo test randomizing the opening
time of highway access.
Understanding the spatial and economic consequences of large scale transportation in-
frastructures is important for several reasons. First, access to markets and proximity to
workers and jobs are prominent criteria in the location decisions of firms and households.
As a consequence, transportation infrastructures are an important determinant of individual
welfare and regional disparities. Second, the location of airports and the design of rail,
road, and highway networks influence land use patterns as much as ‘first nature’ geography:
highways have been found to increase the size of cities (Duranton and Turner, 2012), to cause
sub-urbanization (Baum-Snow, 2007; Baum-Snow, Brandt, Henderson, Turner and Zhang,
2017; Garcia-López, Pasidis and Viladecans-Marsal, 2016), to affect the product-mix of cities
(Duranton, Morrow and Turner, 2014), and to increase regional disparities (Baum-Snow,
Henderson, Turner, Zhang and Brandt, 2017; Faber, 2014). Third, at around five percents
of gdp, the financial amounts involved in transportation infrastructure dwarf those of most
other investment programs (Redding and Turner, 2015) but they may also bring large scale
benefits (Allen and Arkolakis, 2014; Donaldson, forthcoming; Donaldson and Hornbeck,
2016). Furthermore, as we document below, highway access leads to worker and resident
sorting along skills and incomes, which is likely to have meaningful implications for segrega-
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tion, voting, and, in federal countries such as Switzerland that grant large budget autonomy
to its municipalities, on tax competition (Eugster and Parchet, in press).
Our paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we develop a spatial general
equilibrium model featuring mobile agents and costly trade in goods among heterogeneous
locations as in Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Redding (2016) or Redding and Turner (2015),
as well as commuting, following Monte, Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017). Our model
innovates by featuring heterogeneous workers and by allowing for the fact that workers
with different skills make different locations choices on average. We achieve the latter by
assuming that idiosyncratic location preferences are distributed Gumbel instead of Fréchet,
as is commonly assumed. This assumption implies that individual location choices follow
a multinomial logit, a functional form that is commonly adopted in empirical work, and it
leads to a strong complementarity between a worker’s skill level and local attractiveness.
Second, existing studies on the heterogeneous impact of transportation infrastructure
over space focus on various economic outcomes leaving distributional effects aside.1 We
complement such studies with micro-evidence on the consequences on the local composition
of the workforce and of the population. We find strong evidence of sorting along skills and
incomes. By linking residential location choices to highway access, we also complement
works studying the sorting of workers with heterogeneous skills and incomes across local
labor markets and cities.2
Third, our empirical identification strategy exploits variation over time within municipal-
ities, as in Donaldson (forthcoming) and Hornung (2015), while much of the literature is
cross-sectional in nature, addressing the non-randomness of highway (or railway) location
using an instrumental variable approach (Mayer and Trevien, 2017; Redding and Turner,
2015). Our long panel data with heterogeneity in the timing of highway construction
allow us to restrict our sample to municipalities close to a highway access and to control
for municipality-specific time trends and yearly common shocks; all municipalities in our
sample are eventually treated. In contrast, comparing municipalities located close to a high-
way with municipalities further away as in a classical difference-in-differences specification
may distort results if the two groups are heterogeneous along some unobserved dimensions
1See Ahlfeldt and Feddersen (2017), Audretsch, Dohse and dos Santos (2017), Banerjee, Duflo and Qian
(2012), Jedwab and Moradi (2016), Qin (2017), and Storeygard (2016) on regional output; Chandra and
Thompson (2000) on regional earnings by industry; Atack, Bateman, Haines and Margo (2010), Baum-Snow,
Henderson, Turner, Zhang and Brandt (2017), Berger and Enflo (2017), Duranton and Turner (2012), and
Hornung (2015) on urban development; Donaldson (forthcoming), Donaldson and Hornbeck (2016), Duranton,
Morrow and Turner (2014), Faber (2014), and Volpe Martincus and Blyde (2013) on trade; Datta (2012), Ghani,
Goswami and Kerr (2015), and Gibbons, Lyytikäinen, Overman and Sanchis-Guarner (2016) on firms; or
Michaels (2008) and Sanchis-Guarner (2012) on labor market outcomes.
2See Behrens, Duranton and Robert-Nicoud (2014), Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2008), De La Roca
(2017), De La Roca and Puga (2017), Diamond (2016), Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2013), Handbury (2013) or
Moretti (2013). Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, Puga and Roux (2012) and Gaubert (2017) deal with the sorting
of heterogeneous firms.
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(Gobillon and Magnac, 2016). Indeed, even without the advent of a highway, municipalities
between two major cities may experience higher degree of accessibility than regions further
away in the periphery and therefore follow a different growth trajectory, though this issue
is probably relatively mundane in our case.3 Moreover, in a spatial economy in which
no location is totally isolated, even municipalities that are remotely located are treated by
the expansion of the highway network, possibly only little so, likely negatively, but treated
nonetheless (Redding and Turner, 2015).
1. Model
We design a spatial equilibrium model featuring trade, commuting, and discrete location
choices as in Monte, Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) and workers endowed with het-
erogeneous effective units of labor. We depart from Monte, Redding, and Rossi-Hansberg’s
model in two respects: we allow for worker skill heterogeneity and we assume that individ-
ual location choices follow a multinomial logit.
The economy consists of a set N of locations and a measure Λ of workers. Individuals
may reside and work in any location and the two are not necessarily the same. We design
residential locations by subscript n ∈ N and workplace allocations by subscript i ∈ N (thus
an individual working in i and living in n faces the wage rate wi and the price index Pn).
1.1 Endowments and Preferences
Each location is endowed with a fixed supply of residential land Hn. Workers hold het-
erogeneous endowments of effective units of labor and heterogeneous preferences about
each pair of locations. To save on notation we henceforth identify a worker with her
endowment of effective units of labor, ` ∈ [0,1], with cumulative distribution function F (`).
Let L¯ ≡ ∫ 10 `dF (`) denote the average skill level in the economy. Specifically, the utility of a
worker endowed with ` units of labor, residing in n, and working in i is equal to
Uni(`) =
(
Cni(`)
α
)α (Hni(`)
1− α
)1−α
Bniβni(`), α ∈ (0,1). (1)
Cni(`) and Hni(`) denote `’s consumption of the final good C and housing services H , Bni
denotes the common component of the joint assessment of locations n and i as residential
and working locations, respectively, and βni(`) denotes the idiosyncratic component of the
joint assessment of the pair (n,i). Bni captures both n- and i-specific amenities, as well
3We control in all regressions that we report for municipality-specific trends, a special case of interactive
fixed effects that imposes a fixed form for the common factor (Bai, 2009). Moreover, as we report in Table 1
below, the observable characteristics of treated and non-treated municipalities are similar on average.
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as pair-specific amenities such as the utility cost of the bilateral commute. Therefore, a
reduction in the bilateral commuting time corresponds to an increase in Bni.
Let pn and qn respectively denote the prices of C and H pertaining in n,
Pn ≡ pαnq1−αn (2)
denote the price index or the cost of living in n, and wi denote the unit labor cost pertaining
in i. The labor earnings of worker ` when working in i is then equal to `wi. The indirect
utility function associated with (1) is equal to
Vni(`) = βni(`)Vni`, where Vni ≡ Bniwi
Pn
(3)
denotes the common component of Vni(`).
1.2 Worker Location and Commuting
We assume that the βni(`)’s are independently and identically drawn from a Gumbel distri-
bution with mean zero and standard deviation pi/
√
6 so that the probability that worker `
chooses to live in n and work in i, denoted as λni(`), obeys the multinomial logit with shape
parameter  > 0:
λni(`) =
exp (`Vni/)
∑r∈N ∑s∈N exp (`Vrs/)
. (4)
Note that λni(`) is log-supermodular in Vni and `: this strong complementarity between a
worker’s skills and (endogenous) amenities implies that the high-` workers disproportion-
ately pick high-Vni residential-working pairs of locations.4 High-skilled workers are also
more sensitive to changes in V . To see this property of the model, let us compute the
semi-elasticity of the odds of living in n and working in i with respect to Vni,
∂
∂Vni
ln
(
λni
1− λni
)
=
`

. (5)
It is increasing in ` by inspection.
The population of workers who reside in n is equal to
Rn = Λ
∫ 1
0
∑
i∈N
λni(`)dF (`). (6)
4To see this result, let ` and `′ be two arbitrary workers such that `′ > ` and Vni and Vrs be two arbitrary
pairs of locations such that Vrs > Vni; then the following equality holds by inspection:
λni(`)
λrs(`)
(
λni(`
′)
λrs(`′)
)−1
= exp
(
(`′ − `) (Vrs − Vni)

)
> 1,
namely, the higher skill worker `′ is the most likely of the two workers to pick the relatively high amenity
location pair (r,s).
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By the same token, employment in i and the effective labor force in i are respectively equal
to
Ei = Λ
∫ 1
0
∑
n∈N
λni(`)dF (`) and Li = Λ
∫ 1
0
∑
n∈N
λni(`)`dF (`). (7)
Location pairs (n,i) that command a relatively high utility Vni end up attracting a large
number of residents by (6) and a high labor force by (7). Wages and prices are two key
components of Vni. We next turn to the determination of wi and Pn.
1.3 Production
We follow Monte, Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) and Redding and Turner (2015) by
modeling the consumption good C as a monopolistically competitive industry à la Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977). Firms produce differentiated products (and hence enjoy market power) under
increasing returns to scale and entry and exit are free so that profits are zero in equilibrium.
Labor is the only input.
The cost function of the representative firm is Ci(x) = (F + x/Ai)wi, where F is the fixed
component of labor, Ai is local tfp, and x denotes output. Profit maximizing firms break
even if and only if the scale of the representative firm and the wage rate respectively obey
xi = AiF (σ− 1) (8)
and
wi =
1
ζ
A1−1/σi fma
1/σ
i , ζ ≡
σ
σ− 1 [F (σ− 1)]
1/σ . (9)
Above, σ is the perceived elasticity of demand and fma denotes ‘firm market access’ and is
defined in (15) below. This expression implies that nominal labor productivity is higher in
locations endowed with a high tfp and a good access to markets; wages are also decreasing
in the firm markup (the first term in the right-hand side of the definition of ζ) and in the
fixed cost of production.
Let Mi denote the mass of firms that enter the labor market in i. Labor market clearing
requires Li = Mi(F + xi/Ai); using (8), this expression implies that the equilibrium mass of
firms is proportional to the labor force in effective units and equal to
Mi =
Li
Fσ
. (10)
1.4 Consumption
We assume that the consumption good C is a ces aggregate of differentiated varieties that
are tradable among locations, with pairwise elasticity of substitution σ > 1; the cost of
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purchasing one unit of the basket C at location n is equal to
pn =
(
1
cman
)1/(σ−1)
,
where cma denotes ‘consumer market access’ and is defined in (14) below. This expression
implies that the tradable goods are more affordable in locations that are cheap to source to.
In equilibrium workers spend a fraction 1− α of their income on land. We assume for
simplicity that landowners are immobile and spend all of their earnings on the consumption
good C. This assumption implies that total expenditure on C is equal to
pnCn = vnRn, where vn ≡
Λ
∫ 1
0 ∑i∈N λni(`)wi`dF (`)
Rn
(11)
is the average earnings of the workers residing in n. The market clearing price in the local
residential land market, qn, obeys
qnHn = (1− α)vnRn. (12)
1.5 Trade
Bilateral trade of the differentiated good C is costly. We assume that Tni ≥ 1 units of the
good must be shipped from i to arrive in n. Mill pricing is optimal under Dixit-Stiglitz
monopolistic competition so that pni = Tni σσ−1
wi
Ai
. It then follows that the combined market
shares of firms producing in i and selling in n is equal to
pini =
Li (Tniwi/Ai)
1−σ
∑j∈N Lj (Tnjwj/Aj)
1−σ (13)
and that consumer market access is equal to
cman = p
1−σ
n = ∑
i∈N
T 1−σni Mi
(
σ
σ− 1
wi
Ai
)1−σ
=
Ln
σFpinn
(
σ
σ− 1
Tnnwn
An
)1−σ
, (14)
where the last equality follows from (10) and from applying (13) to pinn, the so-called
‘autarkyness’ of municipality n (Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare, 2012). Consumers
located in n enjoy a good market access if their municipality has a low degree of ‘autarkyness’
and its firms charge low prices. Municipality n is open to trade if bilateral trade costs between
n and locations offering any combination of many firms (and hence many differentiated
varieties), high tfp, and low wages, are low; its firms charge low prices if wages and own
trade costs are low relative to local tfp.
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Firms located in i enjoy a good market access if bilateral costs between i and locations
offering a combination of high expenditure and low competition are low:
fmai = ∑
n∈N
T 1−σni vnRnp
1−σ
n . (15)
Plugging (14) and (15) into (3) and using (2) and (9) yields the following relationship
between the common component of utility Vni on the one hand and bilateral amenities as
well as our two measures of market access on the other:
Vni =
1
ζ(1− α)1−αA
1−1/σ
i fma
1/σ
i Bnicma
α/(σ−1)
n
[
vnRn
Hn
]−(1−α)
. (16)
Residential-working pairs that command good firm and consumer market access are de-
sirable because they command high wages and low consumer prices. Desirable bilateral
amenities such as short commutes also act as pull factors; in turn, desirable residential
locations attract a large number of residents by (4), and disproportionately the high earners
among them, both leading to high housing prices, which then act as a stabilizing push factor.
1.6 Equilibrium
Building on Allen and Arkolakis (2014), Monte, Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) and
Redding and Turner (2015), we can describe the equilibrium as the vector of the variables
Θn ≡ {wn,vn,qn,pn,Ln,Rn} and the function U(`), where
U(`) ≡ E[Uni(`)] =  ln
(
∑
n∈N
∑
i∈N
exp
(
`Vni

))
,
as shown by Small and Rosen (1981). Note that this expression yields an economic interpre-
tation of the denominator of the λin’s of (4) as the exponential of the expected utility U(`)/.
We can express all other endogenous variables of the model as functions of the vector Θn
and of the function U(`). The novelty of our framework is that agents are heterogeneously
skilled and U(`) is a function, not a scalar.
The equilibrium vector Θn solves the following set of equations: income equals expendi-
ture,
wiLi = ∑
n∈N
pinivnRn;
the labor force, (7); the residential population, (6); the average residential income, (11); the
market clearing condition for land, (12); and the price index of the differentiated good, (14).
Finally, the full employment conditions
Λ = ∑
n∈N
Rn = ∑
i∈N
Ei =
1
L¯ ∑i∈N
Li
pin down the function U(`).
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1.7 From Theory to Estimation
Consider an arbitrary municipality m before and after it gets connected to the highway
network. In the model, its residential population varies according to (6):
dRm =
∫ L
0
∑
i∈N
dλmi(`)dF (`). (17)
Likewise, employment and the effective labor force of such a municipality vary according to
(7):
dEm =
∫ L
0
∑
n∈N
dλnm(`)dF (`) and dLm =
∫ L
0
∑
n∈N
dλnm(`)`dF (`). (18)
In order to get an expression for the variation in shares dλ in equations (17) and (18), we can
use (5) to recall that the semi-elasticities of the odds ratio of living in n and commuting to
i with respect to the common component of utility Vni are (i) positive and (ii) increasing
in `. Property (i) implies that municipalities that get a positive shock (dVmi > 0 and
dVnm > 0) attract more residents from all income types and more workers from all skill
types. Property (ii) implies that such municipalities also experience a right shift of the
distribution of residential incomes and a right shift of the distribution of worker skills.
In our reduced form regressions below, we treat a connection to the highway system as
a positive shock to market access (an increase in both fmam and cmam) and to commuter
access (an increase in both Bmi and Bnm). In logarithmic differences:
V̂mi = B̂mi +
α
σ− 1 ĉmam − (1− α)v̂mRm > 0 (19)
and
V̂nm = B̂nm +
1
σ
f̂mam > 0. (20)
Both are positive under the assumption that a highway connection increases producer and
consumer market access, and reduces the bilateral commuting dis-utility. As a result,
highway access to municipality m makes it more attractive to both workers and residents.
The effect of highway access on the number of commuters is ambiguous, however: a
better access from and to municipality m makes it at once a more desirable place to live
(and possibly commute from) and a more attractive workplace (and possibly commute to).
To see this result, consider Vmi/Vmm for an arbitrary municipality i 6= m. If high, this ratio
suggests that m is especially attractive as a residential location and should thus attract many
out-commuters. This ratio is increasing in Bmi/Bmm and in fmai/fmam by (16):
Vmi
Vmm
∝
(
fmai
fmam
)1/σ Bmi
Bmm
. (21)
Highway access of municipality m, conditional on the situation of municipality i, increases
Bmi/Bmm (because highways reduce inter-municipality commuting costs but do not affect
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local traffic directly) and reduces fmai/fmam (because m benefits from an improvement
in firm market access relative to i). The two effects work in opposite directions, with an
ambiguous effect on the number of out-commuters.
Using similar reasoning, the number of in-commuters should rise since highway access
has an unambiguous effect on the ratio
Vnm
Vnn
∝
(
fmam
fman
)1/σ Bnm
Bnn
(22)
which, if high, suggests that municipality m is especially attractive as a production location.
1.8 Qualitative Predictions
Summing up the analysis of the subsection above, the qualitative predictions of the model
that we take to the data are as follows:5
1. Size: A municipality that gets a connection to the highway network experiences an
increase in both employment and population by (6)-(7) and (19)-(20).
2. Composition: A municipality that gets a connection to the highway network experi-
ences a shift to the right of its wage and skill distributions by (5)-(7) and (19)-(20).
3. Commuting: The effect of a highway connection on the number of out-commuters
in a municipality is ambiguous a priori by (21), while the effect on the number of
in-commuters is unambiguously positive by (22). For both out- and in-commuters, the
effect is strongest in absolute value for workers at the top of the skill distribution by
(5)-(7).
2. Empirical Strategy
We assemble several data sets and test the predictions of the model using evidence from
the Swiss highway network. As laid out in more detail in Appendix A, the Swiss highway
network provides an ideal setting for our analysis. The Swiss highway network was to a large
extent defined in 1960 by the federal parliament to connect Switzerland’s largest cities, but
only gradually constructed over the decades that followed. Figure 1 displays the distribution
of municipalities receiving a highway access within 10km reach, by opening year. We exploit
this variation over time to identify the effect of the opening of a new highway access point
on the total number of taxpayers (households), the share of taxpayers in different income
categories, as well as employment and commuting by education levels.
5To get Predictions 1 and 3, plug (5) into (17) and (18), using (19) and (20) for Prediction 1, or (21) and (22)
for Prediction 3. Prediction 2 arises from the magnification of the utility effect into location decisions by skill
level, as explicit in (5).
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2.1 Data
We rely on two sets of household data: tax data from the federal income statistics for the
period 1947-2010 and data on employment from the national censuses from 1950 to 2010.
We construct data on the income distribution using the Swiss federal income tax statistics
with information at the municipality level from 1947 to 2010. These statistics encompass
all regular taxpaying units subject to the federal income tax. These taxpaying units are
individuals or households (depending on the marital status) who reside in Switzerland and
earn no income in foreign countries. This definition excludes foreign taxpayers, taxpayers
with special tax treatment, and taxpayers with annual income below a certain threshold (CHF
16,000 for singles and CHF 27,000 for couples in 2010).6 Data are available on a two-year
basis from 1947 to 2000 and on a yearly basis thereafter. We aggregate all data into two-year
averages.7
Our two main measures of the distribution of income at the municipality level are the
number of taxpayers and the share of taxpayers with income above some income percentiles
(median, 75th and 90th percentile). Percentiles are calculated on the basis of the nation-wide
population of taxpayers for each tax period. To fix ideas, in year 2010 these percentiles
corresponded to pre-tax incomes of chf 54,200, chf 78,300, chf 115,000 for the 50th, 75th
and 90th percentile, respectively.8 We compute percentiles using individual-level data for the
period 1973-2010. For the period 1947-1972 we use statistics at the national level aggregated
by income classes.9
We complement these statistics with census data on employment by education level for
decennial years for the period 1950-2010. We compute residence-based and workplace num-
ber of employees as well as the number of out- and in-commuters for three different levels
of education: compulsory school (“low education”), maturity and professional vocation
(“middle education”), university-level (“high education”) using individual-level census data
available for the years 1970-2010.10 We complement information on workplace-, residence-
6In 2010, the share of taxpayers not paying the federal income tax was 20% and, among those paying the
federal income tax, 90% were regular taxpayers whose earnings accounted for 86% of the taxable income.
7The tax collection changed from a bi-annual praenumerando system to an annual postnumerando system
during the early 2000s (the exact timing varies by canton).
8The average exchange rate between 1970 and 2010 is 1.80 US Dollar to the Swiss Francs (chf).
9The federal income tax statistics for the years 1947-1972 report, at the national level, the number of regular
taxpayers paying a federal income tax and their income by income classes. We approximate percentiles using a
Pareto interpolation. Statistics at the municipality level report the count of taxpayers for 5 to 8 income classes
(depending on the years) with the upper class counting taxpayers with income higher than chf 100,000 (chf
50,000 before 1951). We approximate the share of taxpayers using a linear interpolation between the logarithms
of taxpayer shares and incomes as implied by a Pareto distribution.
10For year 2010, we use the new census that covers a sample of 300,000 individuals each year over the period
2010-2014. Census data contain only information on the residents in Switzerland. The number of workers does
not include cross-border workers living in another country.
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based employment and commuting with census data aggregated at the municipality level
for 1950 and 1960.
Table 1 displays the mean values for different sub-samples. Column (1) refers to all
municipalities, Column (2) to municipalities that are not part of a metropolitan area, and
Column (3) to non-urban municipalities that got a highway access within 10km reach during
the sample period.11 Column (4) presents the mean values for the 27 major ‘urban centers’.12
Non-urban municipalities have on average fewer inhabitants, taxpayers, and workers than
urban municipalities. Treatment of municipalities that are not part of a metropolitan area is
close to random because highways were built with the purpose of connecting Switzerland’s
main cities. Column (3) municipalities form our sample group for this reason. Observe
that the average non-urban municipality that got a 10km highway access during the sample
period is very similar to the average non-urban municipality that did not get such access
(figures in Columns (2) and (3) are very similar).
2.2 Identification
Our identification strategy exploits the spatial variation and the long panel dimension of
the data in three ways. First, we rely on a long panel data set in which the timing of the
treatment (i.e. opening of the highway access point) differs across the various sections of the
highway network. We restrict our sample to municipalities that get a highway access over
our observation period and exploit the heterogeneity in the opening time of the access as in
Donaldson (forthcoming) and Hornung (2015). Thus, all municipalities in our sample are
eventually treated. Restricting the sample to municipalities that are all located within the
same distance to the next highway increases the homogeneity of our sample and minimizes
a potential source of bias, which arises if heterogeneous municipalities follow heterogeneous
growth paths.
Second, we include municipality fixed effects as well as municipality-specific time trends
to control for unobservable differences in the growth rate. Note that identification of the
municipality time trends are in large part identified over a large number of pre-treatment
years. We also include year dummies, which account for any macroeconomic shock that
affects all municipalities in the sample. The highway access effects that we estimate are thus
deviations from individual growth trajectories and countrywide shocks.
Third, we exclude urban municipalities from our sample in order to eliminate a major
source of selection bias following Chandra and Thompson (2000) for the us and Faber (2014)
for China. Indeed, in Switzerland as in these large countries, highways were designed to
11We also experiment with other buffers (5km, 15km, and 20km). See footnote 17 below.
12We qualify as ‘centers’ cities of categories 1 and 2 according to the nomenclature of the municipalities
developed by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2000).
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connect the major urban centers so that getting an access to the highways network is as close
to a random event as it gets to non-urban municipalities. These municipalities are small
(see Table 1) and our identifying assumption is that they are unlikely to have systematically
influenced the opening time of the highway access. As we develop in Appendix A, the
design of the Swiss highway network was to a large extent sealed in 1960. The network was
then only gradually constructed over time. Considerations based on inter-city transportation
defined priorities. To the best of our knowledge, the connection of certain municipalities
outside of agglomerations to the highway network did not feature in such considerations.
The opening of certain highway sections was also subject to substantial delays, due to
opposition by environmental groups among other reasons, creating additional randomness
in the timing.
Our long panel data enable us to improve on identification strategies that can rely on
variations across space only. Indeed, peripheral regions that are located along a direct route
between two cities may follow different growth and development paths from those located
further away, irrespective of the opening of a highway or not. We circumvent this issue by
focusing our analysis on non-urban municipalities that eventually get access to a highway
and by including municipality-specific time trends and levels (the implicit common trend
assumption of cross-sectional studies is un-testable by construction, see e.g., Datta, 2012, p.
55). Since all municipalities in our sample eventually get treated, but only gradually over
time, there are treated and control municipalities at any point in time. Furthermore, the
treatment and the control groups are similar. This being said, non-urban municipalities in
our sample are very similar to non-urban municipalities that are excluded form it along
observable dimensions (see columns (2) and (3) of Table 1). It turns out that our results
are largely unaffected if we include non-treated municipalities as a control group in our
regression analysis (see Section 4.3).
Proper identification of our coefficients also requires that municipalities that are treated
early be similar to municipalities that are treated later on. Table 2 reports summary statistics
pertaining to the planning phase (1947-1955), namely, before the opening of the first highway
section. Column (1) displays the mean values for our sample of non-urban municipalities
that eventually get a 10km-highway access. Columns (2) to (4) decompose the sample
according to different stages of the construction of the network. The fifth column reports the
p-values of testing the hypothesis that the figures reported in columns (2)-(4) are identical.
Results display no statistically meaningful differences in the mean population, number of
taxpayers, workplace- and residence-based employment, nor in the growth rate or the income
distribution of taxpayers between municipalities getting a 10km-highway access before 1970,
between 1970 and 1990, or after 1990. We conclude that there is no observable difference
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among such municipalities in terms of overall economic activity or residential composition.13
In this paper we estimate the effects of highways on location decisions. The Swiss
railway network is also famously developed and its expansion would be a confounding factor
undermining our identification strategy if its developments were systematically correlated in
time and space with the opening of highways. There is no evidence that is the case over our
period of observation. The Swiss railway network was to a very large degree constructed in
the second half of the 19th century and in the first decade of the 20th century. Switzerland
had one of the densest railway networks across the world already back in 1900. By that
time, 70% of Switzerland’s population lived in a municipality crossed by a railway track
(Büchel and Kyburz, 2016). Further expansion of the railway network after the first decade
of the 20th century was limited. The next major upgrade of the network took place in 2004
only, with the so-called “Bahn 2000” (or “Rail 2000”) initiative. The network expanded with
the opening of 51km of lines, which amounts to the cumulative expansions of the ninety
preceding years (Wägli, 2010).
The main enhancement of rail services in the 20th century came from the development
of commuter lines within major urban areas towards the end of the century.14 These urban
areas are excluded from our sample. Another major improvement in the quality of the public
transportation offering was the introduction of the hourly timetable in May 1982.15 Its effect
is accounted for by our year dummies as it affected all train connections simultaneously.
2.3 Specification
We identify the effect of highway access by exploiting the heterogeneity in the opening times
of highway accesses across municipalities using the panel dimension.
We use a distributed lag model and focus on the long-term effect of highway access
because we expect the effect of highways to materialize over time. Our baseline specification
includes 10 two-year lags of the highway access variable (i.e. 20 years), yielding the following
regression equation:
lnni,t =
10
∑
τ=0
βτ Accessi,t−τ + αi + λt + ρi t+ εi,t , i = 1,...,782, t = 1947,...,2010, (23)
where subscripts i and t denote municipality and a two-year periods, respectively; ni,t is the
number of taxpayers or the share of taxpayers in different income percentiles; Accessi,t is a
13There is a borderline statistically significant (at 10%) difference in the share of bottom-50% income taxpay-
ers. Differences in mean values are however very small and thus unlikely to have affected the highway opening
year in a substantial way. Note that the negative growth rate of the number of taxpayers is due to changes in
deductions of the federal income tax for the fiscal periods 1949/50 and 1951/52.
14For instance, Zurich’s S-Bahn commuter train was launched in 1990, Basel’s Regio-S-Bahn in 1997 (see
Berger, Güller, Mauch and Oetterli, 2009).
15The hourly timetable ensures that the same train connections are offered at the same time every hour.
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dummy variable that takes the value 1 for municipalities with access to a highway within
a road distance of a certain number of kilometers, and zero otherwise; αi is a municipality
fixed effect, ρi t is a linear municipality time trend, λt is a year fixed effect, and εi,t is a
municipality-year error term, clustered at the municipality level.
We are interested in the long-term impact of highway access, γ ≡ ∑10τ=0 βτ . Following
Davidson and MacKinnon (2004, p. 575), we therefore reparametrize equation (23) by adding
and subtracting ∑10τ=1 βτ Accessi,t, so that we can estimate γ directly:
lnni,t = γ Accessi,t +
10
∑
τ=1
βτ (Accessi,t−τ −Accessi,t) + αi + ρi t+ λt + εi,t . (24)
Above, γ quantifies the effect on the variable of interest at the municipality level of getting
a highway access at time t relative to getting it at a later stage. As such, it is thus a lower
bound to the effect of getting a highway access relative to not getting it. The latter effect can
be estimated using a difference-in-difference estimator, which we perform in Section 4.3.16
In the baseline specification, we only include one specific Accessi,t variable, relating to
all municipalities that eventually get an access to the highway within 10km.17 In additional
specifications, we include a vector of Accessi,t variables (e.g., for 0-5, 5-10, 10-15, 15-20km) in
order to identify the long-term effect for different distance bandwidths at the same time.
3. Results
In this section we report regression results of various estimations of equation (24).
3.1 Size and Composition of Taxpayer Populations
We start by estimating the long-term effects of highway access on the number of taxpayers
(Qualitative Prediction no. 1 of Subsection 1.8) and on the income distribution (Qualitative
Prediction no. 2) for our baseline sample of municipalities. Table 3 contains the results.
16Insofar as results are similar in magnitude, we conclude that treated and non-treated municipalities are
similar conditional on municipality fixed effects and time trends.
17The 10km-buffer appears to be a reasonable threshold for our baseline specification for several reasons.
First, like Faber (2014) for the Chinese National Trunk Highway System, we find that the effect vanishes
quickly beyond 10km. Second, the typical distance between two highway stops in Switzerland equals 5-10km.
A distance band of 10km around each access point implies that our sample of municipalities encompasses
municipalities located in a corridor of roughly 10km on both sides of the highway. Third, as explained in
Appendix B, the actual individual travel distances are likely distributed around our proxy by up to a few
kilometers, due to the geographical spread of people within municipalities. Therefore, a more narrow definition
(e.g., 5km) might exclude municipalities with individuals that are actually in close reach of the highway. Finally,
close proximity to a highway also brings negative externalities to residents. For this reason, people are likely
to desire living in municipalities close to, but not directly located along, a highway. Allowing for a distance of
up to 10km takes such preferences into account.
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All specifications include ten two-year lags, municipality fixed effects, and year dummies.
Columns (2)-(6) also control for municipality-specific linear time trends.
Qualitative Prediction no. 1 (Municipality Size)
The long-term effect of getting a highway access within 10km on the number of taxpayers
in the municipality is positive and statistically significant. Controlling for a municipality-
specific time trend, in column (2), leads to a smaller estimated effect (the difference between
the two being statistically insignificant). The effect of highway access is also economically
significant: on average, the number of taxpayers twenty years (ten periods) after the opening
of an access point within 10km is approximately 11.1% higher (e0.105− 1 = 0.1107) than what
it would be in the absence of such an access, had the taxpayer population of the municipality
continued to grow along its trend.
Qualitative Prediction no. 2 (Municipality Composition)
Columns (3) to (6) investigate the effects of a highway access on the distribution of taxpayers
within municipalities. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the share of
various groups of taxpayers classified according to the percentiles of the nation-wide income
distribution. Column (3) reports that the opening of a nearby highway access within 10km
led to a decrease of the share of taxpayers with a below-median income by about 6.2%.
Columns (4) to (6) indicate that the shares of taxpayers between the median and the third
quartile, between the top quartile and the top decile, and of the top decile increased by 5%,
17.2%, and 18.8%, respectively. The difference between the effects reported in Column (4) and
Column (5) is statistically significant, while results from Column (5) cannot be distinguished
statistically from Column (6).
To sum up, we find that highway access has a positive effect on the size of local jurisdic-
tions and shifts the income distribution towards higher incomes.
3.2 Employment Size and Composition
The results on the distribution of income reported in the previous subsection cannot fully
distinguish between a heterogeneous increase in earnings and income sorting. For this
reason, we complement these results with an analysis of the effects of highway access on
employment by education level (Qualitative Prediction no. 2). For the sake of comparison
with Table 3, we also report the effects of highway access on total employment (Qualitative
Prediction no. 1).
Table 4 presents the results using decennial census data on the working population. The
data cover the period 1950 to 2010. Because census data collect information only every ten
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years (seven decades), we have far fewer observations than in Subsection 3.1. We estimate
our baseline equation (24) using two lags of our access dummy variable. We report results
for employees residing in the treated municipality in Panel A and for employees working
in the municipality in Panel B. All regressions include municipality fixed effects, year fixed
effects, and municipality time trends. Thus, the coefficients of Table 4, Column (1) should be
compared to those of Table 3, Column (2).
Qualitative Prediction no. 1 (Municipality Size)
The coefficient of the long term effect for the number of residents (Table 4, Panel A, Col. 1)
is positive (+7,4%) and statistically significant while the long term effect for the number of
workers (Table 4, Panel B, Col. 1) is also positive (+4,7%) but not statistically significant.
Qualitative Prediction no. 2 (Municipality Composition)
Columns (2) to (5) of Table 4 restrict the sample to years 1970-2010 for which employment by
education level is available. The size of the sample drops further by more than a fourth and
coefficients are less precisely estimated as a result. Column (2) replicates the specification
of Column (1) and the estimated long-term effect effect loses statistical significance. Results
on the composition effect show that highway access attracts high-skilled residents (Panel A,
Col. 5) and workers (Panel B, Col. 5) disproportionally more than residents and workers
with intermediate level of education (Col. 4). These results are consistent with the result of
Table 3 on the share of top-income taxpayers.
3.3 Commuting
In this subsection we investigate the evidence for Qualitative Prediction no. 3. We expect that
a highway access increases the numbers of in-commuters, while the effect on the number of
out-commuters is ambiguous a priori. In both cases, the effect on commuters is predicted to
be strongest at the top of the skill distribution.
We report the results in Table 4, Panels C and D. We find evidence that the number of
in-commuters indeed increases by 19.5% as a result of highway access (Panel D, Col. 1).
The effect is less precisely estimated for the census sub-sample of years 1970-2010 (Panel
D, Col. 2). The composition of in-commuters also changes with an increase in the share
of in-commuters with high education and a decrease in the share of in-commuters with
intermediate level of education (Panel D, Col. 4 and 5). In contrast to in-commuters, we
find no effect on the number of out-commuters (Panel C, Col. 1 and 2). However, consistent
with our theoretical prediction, we do find a positive effect on the share of high-skilled
out-commuters (Panel C, Col. 5).
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It is instructive to cross these results with the 2015 survey results of the Federal Statis-
tical Office’s (2017) ‘Microcensus Mobility and Transport’, which reports an increase in the
average commuting distance over time and a less-than proportional increase in the average
commuting time, as well as a positive correlation between the daily distance traveled by a
household and its income. Together, these results and our findings suggest that highways
may ease the dual location choice of households and individuals as residents and workers
and that this effect especially benefits those at the top of the skill distribution.
3.4 Sprawl
In this subsection we are interested in the relationship between urban sprawl and highway
access. For this purpose, we include all urban municipalities to our sample. These are the 27
largest Swiss cities and towns, ranging from Zurich (382,623 inhabitants) to Locarno (15,637
inhabitants). Table 1, column (4), reports the summary statistics for this sample.
Table 5 reports the regression results. We find that highways contribute to the spatial
decentralization of jobs and residences and that this process is especially pronounced for
the high-skilled. Specifically, the coefficients in column (2) imply that highway access
leads to substantial long term reductions in the numbers of residents and jobs in central
municipalities: about a third for the former (−33%, Panel A) and about a quarter for the
latter (−22%, Panel B). The reductions of the numbers of in- and out-commuters (Panels C
and D) depict a similar picture.
Where do these residents and jobs move to? The coefficients of column (2) seem to
be answering ’all over the place’: the coefficients of the long-term effects on non-central
municipalities are positive but imprecisely estimated. The coefficients of column (1), which
we estimate using the longer panel, suggest that residents and jobs moved within 40km of
the central municipality.
Columns (3) to (5) reveal a increase in the share of low-skilled residents and workers (Panel
A) and workers (Panel B) in central municipalities, especially at the expense of the share
of high-skilled residents and workers. The pattern for out-commuters is similar (Panel C).
Interestingly, highway access leads to an increase in the share of high-skilled in-commuters in
central cities, which implies that high-skilled residents flee central municipalities in highest
number than high-skilled jobs.
Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte and Owens (2009) report that the sub-urbanization for both jobs and
residences was at work in 1980-90 in the us. Our results suggest that the same pattern may
be at work in Switzerland, especially at the top of the skill distribution, and that highways
are contributing to it.
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4. Further Results and Robustness Checks
4.1 Impact over Time
The baseline results for taxpayers presented in Table 3 examine the long-term effect of a
highway access after 10 two-year periods, namely, 20 years. However, the opening of a
nearby highway access likely already leads to effects that materialize over shorter time lags,
as acknowledged by the vector of βτ ’s in our baseline specification in (23) or (24). Here
we investigate the shape of the impact over time, designing a strategy similar to Chandra
and Thompson (2000); specifically, we include eight forward lags (τ ∈ {−8,...,10} in the
terminology of subsection 2.3) and estimate the values of β˜τ = ∑τs=0 βs for τ ≥ 0 and β˜τ =
∑τs=−8 βs for τ < 0. That is to say, β˜τ estimates the effect of highway access τ periods after
getting the access if τ is positive (and τ periods before it if τ is negative). We lump together
years 20 and more in a single dummy variable. We include the same full set of municipality
fixed effects, linear time trends, and year dummies as in our baseline specification, equation
(24) and regression results in Table 3, Col. (2).
Figure 2 displays the results for the number of taxpayers as dependent variable. In line
with expectations, the positive effect of the highway opening gradually increases over time
as relocation and moving is costly and construction of new housing takes time. There is
no effect for the years prior to the opening until 4 years before, indicating that pre-opening
dynamics are correctly captured by the set of fixed effects. The positive impact of highway
access observed after year -4 is likely driven by the construction of the highway itself, similar
as for other major transportation infrastructures (Ahlfeldt and Feddersen, 2017). Remember
that the number of taxpayers consists of households that do pay the federal income tax,
i.e. are above exemption levels. An increase in the number of taxpayers reflects therefore
both positive net in-migration (of non-poor taxpayers) as well as an increase in income of
residents driven by more economic activity (due to, e.g., the construction of the highway).
This explanation is supported by Figure 3, which displays the results for the number of
taxpayers in the top-25% of the nation-wide income distribution. Highway access has no
discernible impact on the number of top-income taxpayers before the highway opening.
4.2 Placebo Test for Opening Years
To further validate our baseline results we run a placebo experiment by randomizing 1,000
times the opening access date among the municipalities included in our sample (i.e. non-
urban municipalities within 10km of a highway access). Figure 4 plots the distribution of the
long-term coefficients obtained by estimating the baseline model for the number of taxpayers.
Dashed lines show the implied estimate for which an effect is statistically significant at a 5%
significance level. The red line is the coefficient from the baseline regression of Table 3,
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column (2). Figure 4 reports that our baseline estimate is three times as large as one obtained
only by chance. It therefore confirms the positive effect of highway access on the number of
taxpayers.
4.3 Difference-in-Differences Estimates
In our central specifications γ quantifies the long run effect of getting a highway access on the
variables of interest at time t relative to getting it at an earlier time. Here, we report estimates
of the effect of getting a highway access relative to not getting it, which we estimate using
a difference-in-differences estimator, on the size and composition of municipalities. The
number of municipalities in the extended sample almost doubles: about half of munici-
palities are never directly treated and thus form the ‘control’ group. With the exception
of the average distance to the closest urban center, these municipalities are observationally
similar to ‘treated’ municipalities in the senses that the averages and standard deviations
of the variables of interest of the two groups are statistically indistinguishable at the usual
confidence levels (see columns (2) and (3) of Table 1).18
Table 6 reports the results. The coefficients of this difference-in-differences specification
are quantitatively close to those of our central within specification reported in Table 3. This
result suggests that treated and untreated municipalities are similar, conditional on their
time invariant characteristics and their specific time trend.
4.4 Heterogeneous Effects
Results in Table 3 are calculated for a single distance band of 0-10km around the highway
access point. In Table 7, we differentiate the effect for distance bands of 5km width up to a
distance of 20km. Here, the sample is the population of non-urban municipalities that gained
access to the highway network within 20km during our observation period (the number of
such municipalities is 1263, to be compared with 782 municipalities in our baseline sample).
Column (1) explores the effect of highway access on the number of taxpayers. Results
show that the positive effect is restricted to municipalities within 10km from the highway ac-
cess, with municipalities located further away experiencing no effect statistically significantly
different from zero.
Columns (2) to (5) explore the effect on the distribution of taxpayers within municipalities
for different distance bands. Change in income distribution are concentrated mainly among
municipalities located between 5 and 15km. Interestingly, municipalities located between 10
and 15km experienced a shift to the right of their income distribution but no change in the
18The average distance to the closest urban center of the connected municipalities is 14% lower than that
of the non-connected ones. This qualitative result is to be expected, since the purpose of the Swiss highway
network is to connect its urban centers.
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total number of taxpayers. Highway access has no effect on municipalities located beyond
15km, except for the top-10% income taxpayers.
Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the impact of a reduction in transportation costs on employment
and the residential location decisions of a heterogeneous population. To this aim, we first
develop a multi-region model with trade and commuting costs, and where workers are
endowed with heterogeneous location preferences and labor productivity. Location choices
are modeled as a multinomial logit. In this environment, high-skilled (high-income) workers
are more sensitive to income and cost changes and, therefore, benefit more from an im-
provement in accessibility than lower skilled workers. The model leads to three predictions:
(1) municipalities that get a highway connection attract more workers and more residents;
(2) these municipalities also become relatively high-type abundant; and (3) the number of
in-commuters increases while the effect on the number of out-commuters is ambiguous a
priori. The effect is however strongest for both in- and out-commuters at the top of the skill
distribution. A corollary of this mechanism is that highways contribute to skill-biased urban
sprawl.
We provide empirical evidence for these theoretical predictions by analyzing the impact
of the Swiss highway network on the number and distribution of taxpayers as well as on
employment and commuting at the local level. For identification purposes, we primarily rely
on time variation based on a long panel data set covering the period 1947-2010. Specifically,
our sample consists of non-urban municipalities that eventually get access to a highway entry
and exit point within 10km. We exploit the fact that the sections of the highway network,
which had been defined to a large extent in 1960 by the federal parliament, were opened
at different points in time spanning several decades. Using this ’within’ variation mitigates
potential issues resulting from differences in growth trends across municipalities that are
unrelated to the transport infrastructure of interest, but might be systematically correlated
with accessibility measures and thus undermine the common trend assumption.
Our results show that access to a new highway leads to an increase both in the total
number of taxpayers and in the share of high-income taxpayers in our sample of Swiss
municipalities. Highway access also has a causal effect on employment and on the number
of in-commuters in the connected municipalities; the latter effect is driven by a rise in the
number of highly educated workers. We also find an effect on the number of out-commuters
at the top of the skill distribution. The empirical findings thus provide support for the
theoretical predictions of the model. The data are also consistent with the hypothesis that
Swiss highways contributed to urban sprawl in the country.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics
All municipalities Non-agglomeration Non-agglomeration Urban centers
municipalities municipalities,
access within 10 km
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population (in 1,000) 2.73 1.14 1.18 64.10
(10.72) (1.42) (1.47) (75.48)
#Taxpayers (in 1,000) 0.83 0.31 0.33 25.41
(4.04) (0.47) (0.49) (31.99)
Share in bottom-50% income 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.50
(0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.06)
Share in 50-25% quartile 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.25
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02)
Share in top-25-10% 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.15
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Share in top-10% decile 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.10
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
#Workers (in 1,000) 1.25 0.43 0.43 48.83
(8.15) (0.69) (0.72) (65.60)
Share with low education 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.24
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.09)
Share with middle education 0.53 0.52 0.53 0.54
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.06)
Share with high education 0.13 0.11 0.12 0.22
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
#Residents (in 1,000) 1.24 0.51 0.53 31.18
(5.47) (0.66) (0.68) (38.79)
Share with low education 0.30 0.33 0.32 0.27
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.08)
Share with middle education 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.51
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.07)
Share with high education 0.16 0.13 0.14 0.22
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
#Out-commuters (in 1,000) 0.56 0.23 0.26 7.56
(1.37) (0.33) (0.36) (8.39)
Share with low education 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.24
(0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.08)
Share with middle education 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.51
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.08)
Share with high education 0.17 0.15 0.16 0.24
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
#In-commuters (in 1,000) 0.57 0.13 0.15 25.21
(4.11) (0.33) (0.37) (36.10)
Share with low education 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.20
(0.18) (0.21) (0.20) (0.09)
Share with middle education 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.56
(0.17) (0.20) (0.19) (0.07)
Share with high education 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.23
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Distance to closest urban center 22.80 27.12 23.36 -
(16.14) (16.54) (13.03)
No. of municipalities 2479 1571 782 27
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. Population is based on yearly data for 1981-2010 and decennial
census data for 1950-1980. Number of workers (residents) is the number of employees working (residing) in
a municipality. The number of out-commuters (in-commuters) consists of the number of residents (workers)
working (living) in another municipality. Source: Decennial population census data 1950-2010 (1970-2010 for
decomposition by education level). Distance to the closest urban center is computed using the road network as
of 2012 (including highways). An ‘urban center’ is a city of category 1 or 2 according to the nomenclature of the
municipalities developed by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (2000).
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Table 2: Characteristics of municipalities getting a 10km-access to highway by time period
Mean values for period 1947-1955 for restricted sample of municipalities
All opening Access opened Access opened Access opened Test equality
years before 1970 1970-1990 after 1990 p-value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Population (in 1,000) 0.94 0.90 1.00 0.82 0.26
(1.13) (0.99) (1.27) (0.87)
#Taxpayers (in 1,000) 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.72
(0.25) (0.19) (0.29) (0.20)
Share in bottom-50% income 0.62 0.62 0.63 0.62 0.09
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Share in 50-25% quartile 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.15
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Share in top-25-10% 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.11
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Share in top-10% decile 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.16
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
#Taxpayers yearly growth rate -7.27 -6.96 -7.72 -6.34 0.15
(30.29) (29.08) (31.37) (29.42)
#Workers (in 1,000) 0.37 0.34 0.40 0.31 0.11
(0.51) (0.44) (0.58) (0.37)
#Residents (in 1,000) 0.40 0.39 0.43 0.35 0.23
(0.49) (0.42) (0.56) (0.36)
No. of municipalities 782 302 391 89 -
Note: Standard errors clustered at municipality level in parentheses. Taxpayer data are based on the Federal
Income Tax statistics for the period 1947-1955. Population, workplace and residence-based employment are
from the population census 1950.
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Table 3: Impact of highway access on number and composition of taxpayers
No taxpayers Share of taxpayers
below 50% top 50%-25% top 25%-10% top 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Long-term effect (γˆ) 0.117*** 0.105*** -0.060*** 0.049*** 0.159*** 0.172***
(0.028) (0.019) (0.011) (0.019) (0.029) (0.046)
10 periods lag included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality time trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 24885 24885 24778 24722 24487 23386
No. of municipalities 782 782 782 782 782 782
R2-adjusted 0.968 0.985 0.713 0.424 0.562 0.479
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by munici-
pality. The sample includes all municipalities within 10km from a highway access that are not part
of a metropolitan area. Two-year panel covering the period 1947-2010. The dependent variable is
the log of the number of taxpayers in columns (1) and (2) and the log of the share of taxpayers in
different income percentiles in columns (3) to (6).
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Table 4: Impact of highway access on employment size and composition
No employees Share of employees
by education level:
low middle high
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Residents
Long-term effect (γˆ) 0.071*** -0.013 -0.058 -0.059* 0.146*
(0.021) (0.036) (0.046) (0.030) (0.075)
No. of observations 5201 3839 3823 3838 3765
No. of municipalities 782 782 782 782 781
R2-adjusted 0.986 0.988 0.887 0.777 0.887
Panel B: Workers
Long-term effect (γˆ) 0.046 0.045 0.030 -0.086** 0.212**
(0.034) (0.050) (0.056) (0.038) (0.083)
No. of observations 5114 3749 3717 3747 3599
No. of municipalities 782 778 778 778 773
R2-adjusted 0.977 0.979 0.817 0.734 0.829
Panel C: Out-commuters
Long-term effect (γˆ) 0.022 -0.016 -0.071 -0.042 0.218***
(0.034) (0.045) (0.057) (0.035) (0.080)
No. of observations 5197 3854 3799 3845 3640
No. of municipalities 782 782 780 782 774
R2-adjusted 0.971 0.978 0.808 0.663 0.851
Panel D: In-commuters
Long-term effect (γˆ) 0.178** 0.145 0.017 -0.124** 0.269*
(0.080) (0.092) (0.090) (0.056) (0.150)
No. of observations 4901 3761 3467 3667 2832
No. of municipalities 779 779 760 776 685
R2-adjusted 0.935 0.951 0.592 0.486 0.639
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered by municipality. The sample includes
municipalities within 10km from a highway access that are not
part of a metropolitan area. Column (1) presents results using
10-year census data from 1950-2010. Columns (2)-(4) restrict
the sample to the period 1970-2010 and use only employees for
which information on education level is available. The number of
workers (residents) consists of the number of employees working
(residing) in a given municipality. The number of out-commuters
(in-commuters) consists of the number of residents (workers)
working (living) in another municipality. All regressions include
municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects, and municipality-
specific time trends.
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Table 5: Impact of highway access on urban sprawl (27 cities)
No employees Share of employees
by education level:
low middle high
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Residents
Long-term effect (center) -0.279*** -0.396*** 0.966*** -0.223*** -1.214***
(0.087) (0.058) (0.130) (0.062) (0.122)
Long-term effect (1-20 km) 0.104*** 0.032 0.012 -0.095*** -0.005
(0.027) (0.036) (0.044) (0.022) (0.056)
Long-term effect (21-40 km) 0.231*** 0.016 -0.055 -0.034 0.138*
(0.029) (0.038) (0.052) (0.034) (0.082)
Long-term effect (>40 km) 0.112 -0.017 0.145 -0.150* -0.105
(0.074) (0.089) (0.133) (0.079) (0.182)
No. of observations 10261 7553 7537 7552 7477
No. of municipalities 1528 1528 1528 1528 1527
R2-adjusted 0.986 0.992 0.891 0.794 0.905
Panel B: Workers
Long-term effect (center) -0.163** -0.254*** 0.216* -0.135*** -0.575***
(0.077) (0.067) (0.114) (0.051) (0.100)
Long-term effect (1-20 km) 0.138*** 0.077* 0.050 -0.133*** 0.129**
(0.030) (0.042) (0.046) (0.026) (0.063)
Long-term effect (21-40 km) 0.102** 0.006 0.067 -0.056 0.308***
(0.044) (0.057) (0.060) (0.042) (0.093)
Long-term effect (>40 km) -0.079 -0.094 0.193 -0.164* -0.127
(0.089) (0.144) (0.139) (0.092) (0.215)
No. of observations 10169 7458 7423 7454 7288
No. of municipalities 1528 1524 1524 1524 1518
R2-adjusted 0.982 0.987 0.829 0.746 0.853
Continued on next page
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel C: Out-commuters
Long-term effect (center) -0.263*** -0.382*** 1.325*** -0.263*** -0.994***
(0.086) (0.101) (0.147) (0.066) (0.125)
Long-term effect (1-20 km) 0.018 -0.036 0.051 -0.067*** 0.030
(0.034) (0.040) (0.051) (0.026) (0.059)
Long-term effect (21-40 km) 0.197*** 0.065 -0.082 -0.034 0.084
(0.042) (0.051) (0.069) (0.038) (0.085)
Long-term effect (>40 km) 0.338*** 0.066 0.029 -0.081 0.153
(0.108) (0.149) (0.156) (0.096) (0.207)
No. of observations 10257 7569 7513 7560 7346
No. of municipalities 1528 1528 1526 1528 1520
R2-adjusted 0.979 0.987 0.832 0.717 0.880
Panel D: In-commuters
Long-term effect (center) -0.263*** -0.470*** -0.252* -0.003 0.352***
(0.087) (0.101) (0.131) (0.056) (0.132)
Long-term effect (1-20 km) 0.107 0.077 0.069 -0.067* 0.295***
(0.069) (0.072) (0.070) (0.037) (0.104)
Long-term effect (21-40 km) 0.223** 0.119 0.028 -0.088 0.336**
(0.092) (0.102) (0.088) (0.058) (0.144)
Long-term effect (>40 km) 0.330 -0.076 0.087 -0.096 0.380
(0.242) (0.286) (0.221) (0.147) (0.318)
No. of observations 9890 7470 7126 7357 6305
No. of municipalities 1525 1525 1504 1521 1417
R2-adjusted 0.956 0.971 0.650 0.535 0.722
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors (in parentheses)
are clustered by municipality. The sample includes all municipalities within
10 km from a highway access (including metropolitan areas). A ‘center’
is defined as a city of category 1 or 2 by the Swiss Statistical Office (27
cities). Column (1) presents results using 10-year census data from 1950-2010.
Columns (2)-(4) restrict the sample to the period 1970-2010 and use only
employees for which information on education level is available. The number
of workers (residents) consists of the number of employees working (resid-
ing) in a given municipality. The number of out-commuters (in-commuters)
consists of the number of residents (workers) working (living) in another
municipality. All regressions include municipality fixed effects, time fixed
effects, and municipality-specific time trends.
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Table 6: Impact of highway access on number and composition of taxpayers – Difference-in-
differences
No taxpayers Share of taxpayers
below 50% top 50%-25% top 25%-10% top 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Long-term effect (γˆ) 0.065*** 0.114*** -0.064*** 0.037** 0.182*** 0.241***
(0.022) (0.019) (0.010) (0.018) (0.027) (0.047)
10 periods lag included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipality time trends No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 50083 50083 49847 49616 48874 45643
No. of municipalities 1571 1571 1571 1571 1570 1566
R2-adjusted 0.959 0.981 0.717 0.442 0.558 0.463
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by
municipality. The sample includes all municipalities that are not part of a metropolitan
area. Two-year panel covering the period 1947-2010. The dependent variable is the log of
the number of taxpayers in columns (1) and (2) and the log of the share of taxpayers in
different income percentiles in columns (3) to (6).
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Table 7: Impact of highway access on number and composition of taxpayers - Distance bands
No taxpayers Share of taxpayers
below 50% top 50%-25% top 25%-10% top 10%
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Long-term effect (0-5 km) 0.051* -0.030* -0.032 0.069* 0.181***
(0.029) (0.016) (0.028) (0.041) (0.069)
Long-term effect (5-10 km) 0.106*** -0.077*** 0.087*** 0.236*** 0.271***
(0.024) (0.013) (0.023) (0.038) (0.063)
Long-term effect (10-15 km) -0.018 -0.036*** 0.054** 0.105*** 0.181***
(0.025) (0.013) (0.022) (0.035) (0.057)
Long-term effect (15-20 km) -0.024 -0.006 -0.007 -0.000 0.115*
(0.024) (0.012) (0.022) (0.036) (0.059)
No. of observations 40239 40059 39935 39483 37262
No. of municipalities 1263 1263 1263 1262 1262
R2-adjusted 0.984 0.712 0.436 0.565 0.462
Notes. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by
municipality. The sample includes all municipalities within 20km from a highway access
that are not part of a metropolitan area. Two-year panel covering the period 1947-2010. The
dependent variable is the log of the number of taxpayers in column (1) and the log of the
share of taxpayers in different nation-wide income percentiles in columns (2) to (5). All
regressions include municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects and municipality-specific
linear time trends.
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Figures
Figure 1: Number of municipalities receiving a highway access within 10km, by opening
year (frequency, left axis; and cumulative, right axis).
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Figure 2: Effect on number of taxpayers over time
Note: The figure shows the point estimates of dummy variables for 16 years before
and up to 20 years after the opening of the highway access. The last dummy
variables takes the value 1 after 20 years and during all years thereafter. Vertical
bars denote the 95% confidence interval of the estimates. The dependent variable is
the log of the number of taxpayers. The sample includes all municipalities within
10km from a highway access that are not part of a metropolitan area. The regres-
sion includes municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects and municipality-specific
linear time trends. Two-year panel covering the period 1947-2010.
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Figure 3: Effect on number of top-25% income taxpayers over time
Note: The figure shows the point estimates of dummy variables for 16 years before
and up to 20 years after the opening of the highway access. The last dummy vari-
ables takes the value 1 after 20 years and during all years thereafter. Lines denote
the 95% confidence interval of the estimates. The dependent variable is the log of
the number of taxpayers in the top quartile of the nation-wide income distribution.
The sample includes all municipalities within 10km from a highway access that
are not part of a metropolitan area. The regression includes municipality fixed
effects, time fixed effects and municipality-specific linear time trends. Two-year
panel covering the period 1947-2010.
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Figure 4: Effect on the number of taxpayers - placebo test
Note: Highway access opening date randomized 1,000 times. The dependent vari-
able in the log of the number of taxpayers. The sample includes all municipalities
within 10km from a highway access that are not part of a metropolitan area. The
regression includes municipality fixed effects, time fixed effects and municipality-
specific linear time trends. Two-year panel covering the period 1947-2010. Dashed
lines show the implied estimate for which an effect is statistically significant at a 5%
significance level. Red line is the coefficient from the baseline regression.
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Appendix A. Background on the Swiss Highway Network
Compared to some of its neighboring countries such as Germany and Italy, Switzerland
began relatively late to construct its own national highway network. After World War II,
the number of cars in Switzerland experienced a strong increase: from 18,000 personal
cars in 1945 to 150,000 in 1950 and 500,000 in 1960 (Grotrian, 2007, p. 44). As a result,
motorized traffic rose strongly and in the late 1950s, the federal government created a
planning commission for a national road network. Before 1950, several ideas for highway
projects in specific regions (e.g., between Berne and Thun) had been put forward, but none
had been realized (see Blum, 1951, pp. 137-144).
The commission analyzed different options for the scope of the future road network, based
on the guiding principle that the national road network should only serve the most important
transport needs, i.e. primarily long-distance travel (Planungskommission, 1959, Band 2, p.
1). The proposal for the national road network not only consisted of highways, but of three
different types of roads, including some class III roads that were opened to non-motorized
traffic as well. In contrast, class I and class II roads were restricted to motorized travel, with
class I roads always requiring a complete separation of the directions of travel and at least
four lanes, two in each direction (Planungskommission, 1959, Band 1, pp. 65-66). In 1960,
the Swiss parliament passed the national roads law and thus also defined the future location
of highways in Switzerland to a large extent.
The subsequent construction of the network spanned over several decades, with cantons
being responsible for detailed planning and actual construction work. As one of the first
sections, the highway between Geneva and Lausanne was opened to public in 1963/1964,
on time for the 1964 national exhibition in Lausanne. A substantial portion of the highway
A1 connecting Geneva in the west with St. Gallen in the east was completed in the late
1960s. Other highways constructed during this early phase included a large portion of the
A3 linking Zurich with the canton of Grisons, and first highway sections in the canton of
Ticino. Other parts of the network, including the construction of the A2 crossing Switzerland
from north (Basel) to south (Chiasso), followed a few years later.
Figure Appendix A.1 contains a map of Switzerland’s municipalities and its national
motorway network as of 20121. The map on the top shows, in light grey, municipalities
with an access point located within 10km reach that was open in 1960, while the map
at the bottom shows municipalities with an access point within 10km open in 2010, the
end of our observation period. Note that municipalities close to the A16 ‘Transjurane’
(North/North-West) are not included in our sample as this highway was not part of the
original planned network but added in 1984 after the creation of the canton of Jura. Shaded
1See Section Appendix B for a definition of motorways and other types of highways.
i
areas are municipalities that are part of a metropolitan area, as defined by the Federal
Statistical Office in 2000.
Besides the cantons, also municipalities and the general public (e.g., land owners) were
granted a say in the planning process of the highway network. As a result, the construction
of the Swiss highway network was characterized by a ‘certain inertia’ not present in other
countries (Ruckli, 1966, p. 7). Moreover, starting in the 1970s, there was growing opposition
against new highway construction by environmental groups, which further slowed down the
process (Schärer, 1999). In 1978, the Federal Council established a commission to reevaluate
the expected benefits of six highway sections that were planned, but not yet constructed. The
recommendation by the commission was to keep all investigated sections in the network,
with the exception of one (see Kommission zur Überprüfung von Nationalstrassenstrecken,
1981). In 1986, the national parliament decided differently, removing two other sections from
the network (Fischer & Volk, 1999).
Today, the Swiss national road network has a defined length of 1,892.5km, only slightly
more than the originally planned network of 1,840km. Of these national roads, roughly
69km still have to be built (Bundesamt für Strassen, 2017). In addition, some cantons have
also established cantonal highways that are not part of the national road network. These
highways represent only a small fraction of all highways, however.
Until 2007, construction and maintenance of the national roads was the responsibility of
the cantons, under supervision of the federal government. However, the cantons received
substantial financial contributions from the federal government (Ruckli, 1966). These federal
funds came from taxes on gasoline, payments from the general budget, and since 1985 from
a yearly lump-sum user fee to use the national highways (the so-called ‘vignette’). In the
initial years between 1959 and 1965, the average funding share of the federal government
equaled 86 percent (Ruckli, 1966, p. 9). Cost of highway construction rose substantially over
time, soon reaching a multiple of the originally projected cost. By 1996, the estimated cost of
the network had increased tenfold (Heller & Volk, 1999). As of January 1, 2008, the national
roads and all responsibilities were transfered to the federal government (Galliker, 2009). The
national road network plays a crucial role for both traffic within Switzerland and transit
across Europe. The national roads account for only 2.5 percent of all roads in Switzerland,
but carry more than 40 percent of all motorized traffic (Bundesamt für Strassen, 2014).
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Figure Appendix A.1: Municipalities with highway access in 1960 and 2010
Note: Shaded areas denote municipalities that are part of a metropolitan area as defined by the Federal Statistical
Office in 2000. Municipalities with highway access within 10km road distance are in light gray. Access points open
at a given year are in yellow.
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Appendix B. Data on Highway Access Points
Our database of highway access points is based on all access points contained in the
VECTOR200 database from the Swiss Federal Office of Topography, swisstopo (version as
of 2013). For each access point, we identified the opening date based on a list with highway
section opening dates provided by the Swiss Federal Roads Office (ASTRA). For access points
for which the list from ASTRA did not contain an opening date, we relied on information
presented in Fischer and Volk (1999), historical maps from swisstopo accessed via their
website, and on other public information sources (press releases, newspaper articles, etc.).
For access points that were subject to capacity enhancements, we used the year when a
new section was originally opened to public, rather than when it was upgraded later. One
limitation of this definition is that some important upgrades of the network (such as the
Kerenzerberg Tunnel along Walensee) are not captured in our database.
We limit our analysis to highways that have the status of national motorways (‘Auto-
bahnen’) or dual-carriageways (‘Autostrassen’), i.e. we exclude from the analysis cantonal
highways. According to the swisstopo classification, national motorways encompass all
fast-traffic controlled-access national roads with at least two lanes in each direction and
a dividing strip while national dual-carriageways are defined as a national motorways
without a dividing strip (with a lower speed limit). Cantonal highways (motorways and
dual carriageways) were not necessarily built in order to connect Switzerland’s large cities,
but to improve accessibility of specific cities or regions2. Therefore, their construction is
prone to be endogenous to local economic development.
For each town and year, we use the ArcGIS software to calculate the minimum road
distance to the next highway access point based on the non-highway road network listed
in the VECTOR200 database. These distances serve as proxy for the actual road distance
between the place of residency in a municipality and the next highway access point. The
actual road distance may slightly deviate from this measure for two main reasons: First, a
municipality may contain more than one town and not all residents live at the town center.
Second, certain local roads which are part of our road network database (consisting of all
roads opened at the end of 2012) may have only been constructed during the course of the
observation period. However, the average area of a municipality only equals approximately
16km2. Therefore, these deviations should be fairly small and not systematically bias the
results, as distances would be overestimated for some residents and underestimated for
others. For municipalities consisting of more than one town, we use the minimum distance.
The same procedure was used for municipalities that merged over the observation period.
2We distinguish between national and cantonal motorways by the requirement of national motorways to
display the national motorway tax vignette on the car.
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Based on the estimated travel distance to the next highway access point, we clustered
municipalities into different distance bands: 1-5km, 5-10km, 10-15km and 15-20km. Distance
band 1-5km includes all municipalities with a calculated road distance of up to 5.0km, band
5-10km all municipalities with a distance larger than 5.0km and up to 10.0km, band 10-
15km all municipalities with a distance larger than 10.0km and up to 15.0km, and band
15-20km all municipalities with a distance larger that 15.0km and up to 20.0km. We exclude
all 908 municipalities that are part of a metropolitan area based on the definition by the
Swiss Federal Statistical Office in 2000, to further reduce potential endogeneity concerns (see
Section 2.2 for details). We also do not look at municipalities located 20km and further
away from highway access points as these municipalities are to a large extent concentrated
in mountainous regions in the cantons of Valais and Berne.
According to the report by the national planning commission, 5, 10 and 15km represent
relevant thresholds for the impact reach of highways. Based on an analysis of personal, labor,
business, cultural and touristic relations, the planning commission estimated that the density
of relations decreases according to the following pattern (see Planungskommission,1959,
Band 2, p. 44): 100% in 0-5km, 75% in 5.1-7.5km, 50% in 7.6-10.0km, 25% in 10.1-12.5km, and
10% in 12.6-15.0km.
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